Formal and Informal Institutions in Wal-Mart Case
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7719/jpair.v11i1.194Keywords:
Agent, financial incentives, regulatory pillar, principalAbstract
This paper analyzes the strategies which are followed by Wal-Mart in different parts of the world from the viewpoint of theories of institutions, property rights and agency. The analysis of the questions what happens to these firms when they are in countries with high corruption index? It could answer this question in light of the theory of institutions, the theory of property rights and the theory of the agency. This paper specifically focuses on finding out if the above theories are applicable. The analysis concludes that the same firm adopts a different strategy in each place even if is in conflict with their values at home.
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Alonso R, O.S. 2012 El universal. Recuperado el 13 de mayo de 2012, de http://www.eluniversal.com.mx
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Copyright (c) 2013 José G. Vargas-hernández
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Open Access. This article published by JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0). You are free to share (copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format) and adapt (remix, transform, and build upon the material). Under the following terms, you must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
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