

Counterinsurgency Operations in the Second District of Sorsogon: Basis for Sustainable Development

ROMEL T. SANTOS^{1*}, MANNY B. MACABEO¹

Bicol College, Daraga, Albay, Philippines

ORCID No.: Romel T. Santos: <https://orcid.org/0009-0008-1438-2800>

Manny B. Macabeo: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9218-0533>

**Corresponding author: rtsmabikas.2010@gmail.com*

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ABSTRACT

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Throughout history, insurgency has been a persistent phenomenon, its origins stemming from various factors such as political, economic, social, and ethnic grievances that drive certain factions or individuals to take up arms in resistance. This study determined the status of COIN operations in terms of Legal basis, Manpower, Financial resources, Logistical resources, and Accomplishments from 2021 to 2023. Likewise, this evaluates the COIN operations of the unit along with the conduct of Internal Security operations, Intelligence operations, and Police Community Affairs and development to determine challenges that were encountered by the personnel. The respondents of the study are the PNP personnel, barangay officials, and former rebels. The counterinsurgency framework presents a comprehensive and strategic approach to addressing insurgency threats, with the potential to significantly enhance the



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conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The findings underscore both the acknowledged strengths and identified areas for enhancement within police operations, as reported by respondents from the PNP. This shows a widespread acknowledgment of the pivotal role of the ISO in upholding internal security and addressing insurgent challenges. It signifies a mutual understanding among diverse stakeholders, encompassing barangay officials, former rebels, and law enforcement personnel, regarding the necessity of proactive strategies to prevent, interrupt, and counter-insurgency operations within impacted localities. Overall, the proposed framework offers a promising strategy for countering insurgency threats and advancing the goals of peace, stability, and security in affected regions.

INTRODUCTION

Counterinsurgency, as perceived by those who execute it, is primarily framed in negative terms, focusing on the eradication or suppression of an insurgency. An insurgency is delineated as a rebellion against a government, falling short of being classified as an organized revolution and lacking recognition as belligerency (Guarnaccia, 2021). Additionally, it is characterized as organized subversion and violence aimed at seizing, neutralizing, or contesting political control of a region. Consequently, it has become a significant area of interest for conflict analysts, with counter-insurgency (COIN) operations now serving as a fundamental component in training contemporary professional armed forces (Hankins, 2020).

In principle, counter-insurgency involves coercive methods to overcome clandestine insurgents on one front while enhancing the overall living standards of civilian populations unaffected by combat. Notably, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States pursued a dual-focused counter-insurgency strategy, seeking to vanquish insurgents while also legitimizing the government's established post-military intervention (Stein, 2019). Similarly, after two decades of expensive counterinsurgency (COIN) endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan, numerous national security analysts—and the American populace—are eager to transition. Nevertheless, even though the United States might be disengaging from COIN, COIN remains pertinent for the United States (Metz, 2021).

To confront insurgency, the Philippine government has employed Military, Political, Socio-economic, and Humanitarian measures alongside national endeavors to quell insurgent activities. With a strong commitment to resolving conflicts peacefully, various stakeholders, including governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations, have collaborated to tackle underlying issues, promote inclusive governance, strengthen security forces, foster socio-economic progress, and engage in localized peace negotiations

through grassroots initiatives (Andreopoulos et al., 2020).

In the Bicol region, particularly in Sorsogon, the presence of NPAs has significantly diminished due to the dismantling of guerrilla fronts by Government Security forces. This reduction can be attributed to a series of surrenders from NPAs and the decision of other members to lie low in pursuit of sustainable livelihoods. However, sporadic clashes with the Philippine Army have been reported in the second district. There are indications of their presence in small numbers in remote barangays, attempting to regain their former support base and engage in extortion activities to fund their illicit operations. Furthermore, left-leaning organizations persist in disseminating propaganda and misinformation online to sway public opinion in their favor.

The research was conducted at Sorsogon Second Provincial Mobile Force Company Headquarters, Barangay Aquino, Bulan, Sorsogon, Police Stations in the Second District of Sorsogon. The researcher chose the place of implementation because it gave the researcher the needed information in the quest to end the Local armed insurgency that troubled the sorsoguenos in the Second district for several decades, affecting lives and property and the future of its youth. The Second District of Sorsogon has a long-standing history of armed insurgency, which has deeply troubled its residents, affected their lives and property, and hindered the region's development. Understanding the root causes and dynamics of this insurgency is crucial for devising effective strategies to address it.

This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the Counterinsurgency operations conducted by the 2nd PMFC in the Second District of Sorsogon against Communist Terrorist Groups (CTGs) and their affiliated party organs within the framework of Internal Security Operations, Intelligence Operations, and Police Community Affairs and Development, in alignment with the support provided to the Armed Forces of the Philippines as mandated by Executive Order No. 70. Additionally, it will highlight the achievements of the unit, identify encountered challenges, and propose a framework for enhancing Counterinsurgency operations. Furthermore, this study will be invaluable to the community, Philippine National Police, Local Government Units, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and external and internal stakeholders, including students and researchers.

The status of counterinsurgency operations in the 2nd Provincial Mobile Force Company (PMFC) in the Province of Sorsogon is outlined through various dimensions, including legal basis, manpower, budget, logistical resources, and accomplishments. Legal frameworks such as Republic Act No. 9851 and the Human Security Act of 2007 provide the legal foundation for conducting counterinsurgency operations, emphasizing accountability and the protection of

human rights. Executive Order No. 70 emphasizes a comprehensive approach involving multi-sectoral collaboration and socio-economic development to address the root causes of insurgency. Additionally, PRO5 Memorandum Circular 23-2023 and PNP Memorandum Circular 2022-006 delineate specific guidelines and strategies for the effective implementation of counterinsurgency efforts, emphasizing coordination with other government agencies and stakeholders.

Manpower in the 2nd PMFC consists of personnel assigned to maneuver companies responsible for executing various tasks crucial to mission success, including patrols, reconnaissance, offensive actions, and security operations. These personnel play a pivotal role in detecting, deterring, and neutralizing insurgent activities while ensuring the safety and security of civilian populations. Financial resources allocated to the unit, including Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) and the Internal Security Operations (ISO) Fund, provide crucial support for administrative, operational, and procurement needs. Logistical resources such as firearms, ammunition, mobility assets, and protective equipment are essential for enhancing the unit's fighting capability, mobility, and operational effectiveness in executing internal security operations and countering insurgent threats.

Relatively, Gingell (2021) suggests that to address these inquiries effectively, it is crucial to first comprehend the reasons behind the constrained efficacy and observed outcomes stemming from the varying utilization of CT and COIN strategies. Gaining comprehensive insight into the operational dynamics that contribute to countering insurgents and terrorists, alongside recognizing the enduring impacts of such approaches, will enable security scholars to conduct empirical assessments of their efficacy.

Also related to this study is the Guépard system, which demonstrated its effectiveness in the initial rigorous examination but encountered challenges in subsequent stages due to France's limited logistical capabilities, fortunately, augmented by French allies. These allies were accountable for 75% of all logistical operations to Mali during Operation Serval. The role of the French President at the outset of Serval was the final pivotal factor for enabling swift French action (Strnad, 2022).

FRAMEWORK

The study is grounded in the Theory of Counterinsurgency by David Galula. The theory of Counterinsurgency offers valuable insights into evaluating counterinsurgency efforts. Galula, a French military officer and scholar, developed principles and strategies for combating insurgencies based on his experiences in Algeria and Indochina. His theory underscores the importance

of comprehending the population's grievances and aspirations and the necessity of gaining their support and cooperation. When evaluating counterinsurgency, Galula's principles serve as a framework for assessing the effectiveness of strategies and tactics employed by security forces (Cunha, 2023).

This is further supported by the Broken Windows Theory (McKee, 2017). This theory suggests that when disorder becomes widespread, it instills fear in the populace, leading them to perceive the area as unsafe. Consequently, people start disengaging from their communities, eroding the social mechanisms that once deterred criminal behavior. This creates a vicious cycle where disorder breeds crime, which in turn perpetuates more disorder and crime. The Broken Windows Theory shows that visible signs of disorder and neglect in a community can lead to an increase in crime and antisocial behavior if not addressed promptly. Applied to counterinsurgency operations, this theory emphasizes the importance of addressing underlying grievances and socio-economic disparities that may fuel the insurgency. Just as neglecting minor infractions can lead to an escalation of crime in a community, failing to address grievances and instability within a population can create fertile ground for the insurgency to thrive. Therefore, by actively addressing socio-economic issues, improving governance, and fostering community trust and cooperation, counterinsurgency efforts can prevent the emergence and growth of insurgent movements, ultimately promoting stability and security within affected regions (McKee, 2017).

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The study evaluates the COIN operation of the Sorsogon Second Provincial Mobile Force Company (2nd PMFC). It identifies the challenges that limit the optimal result of COIN operation under relevant laws, rules, circulars, and issuances by the Philippine National Police. The study intends to explore the status of COIN operations, evaluate them, identify the challenges encountered, and propose a COIN framework and strategies to enhance the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This study is a descriptive quantitative research design. The descriptive research design determines and describes a phenomenon or sample group of a population. The quantitative approach was employed to determine the framework for counterinsurgency operations.

Research Site

This research was conducted in the second congressional district of Albay, one of the three congressional districts in the province of Albay, Philippines. It has had representation in the House of Representatives of the Philippines since 1916, with earlier representation in the Philippine Assembly from 1907 to 1916.

Participants

The participants in this study include personnel from the PNP, personnel from the 2nd PMFC, Barangay Officials, and the former rebels. The PNP personnel were chosen because, typically, they are at the forefront of counterinsurgency efforts due to their role in maintaining law and order. Likewise, the Barangay officials were chosen because they focus on coordinating government programs and initiatives to address the underlying socio-economic grievances that fuel the insurgency. Lastly, the Former rebels who have surrendered or defected are valuable assets in counterinsurgency operations. They provide firsthand insights into insurgent organizations' strategies, tactics, and internal workings. Moreover, their testimonies and experiences were used to dissuade others from joining the insurgency by highlighting its drawbacks and offering pathways to rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

With a sample size of 105 respondents, including members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Barangay Officials (BO), and former rebels, the study offers a comprehensive understanding of stakeholder perspectives on counterinsurgency strategies. PNP respondents express strong support for joint intelligence-driven operations and social media-based Stratcom activities while highlighting reservations about livelihood-focused interventions. Barangay Officials view community mobilization positively but exhibit less enthusiasm for co-opting CTG-affected mass organizations. Former rebels value community engagement and social media campaigns but express disbelief about co-opting CTG-affected mass organizations.

Instrumentation

To address the study's objectives, the survey questionnaire primarily focused on counterinsurgency operations and Internal Security operations, Intelligence Operations, and Police Community Affairs and Development. The questionnaire was designed to collect relevant data from the respondents. To ensure the questionnaire covered the study's intended themes and areas, the items underwent validation by personnel from the 2nd PMFC for face and content validation. The study employed a Likert-type survey questionnaire, offering respondents four choices of answers regarding the counterinsurgency operations.

The questionnaire likely drew its items from a variety of sources, including existing literature on police operations, counterinsurgency strategies, and relevant frameworks. It also incorporated inputs from experts in the field, as well as insights from qualitative interviews or focus groups with stakeholders such as PNP personnel, barangay officials, and former rebels. The items have been carefully crafted to capture key aspects of police operations, perceived strengths, areas for improvement, and attitudes toward counterinsurgency efforts.

To ensure the questionnaire's reliability, several measures have been taken. One common method is conducting a pilot study with a small sample to identify any issues with the questionnaire's wording or structure. This helps ensure that the questionnaire reliably measures the intended variables. Given the importance of capturing diverse perspectives in a study like this, the sample size likely included a sufficient number of respondents from various stakeholder groups, such as PNP personnel, barangay officials, and former rebels. Likewise, the results of the questionnaire were interpreted in the context of counterinsurgency operations, aiming to provide insights into the perceived effectiveness of current strategies and areas for improvement.

Data Collection

During the data collection process, the researcher first obtained approval from the adviser to investigate the counterinsurgency operations in the 2nd PMFC within Sorsogon province. Subsequently, permissions were sought from the Provincial Director, Chiefs of Police in the relevant areas, and the Barangay Captain to proceed with the research. The researcher directly engaged with the respondents, personally distributing the questionnaires. Each participant received a formal introduction to the study's objectives, and strict confidentiality measures were assured regarding the collected data.

Research Ethics Protocol

To guarantee ethical considerations in this study, participation is entirely voluntary, and the researcher has supplied a consent letter to allow respondents to respond freely to the questionnaire. Additionally, respondent anonymity has been preserved. Preserving the dignity of the participants through meticulous wording of the questions was a paramount concern in this research. Ultimately, the researcher is committed to maintaining the study's independence and impartiality in presenting all the collected data.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This part of the study presents the analysis and interpretation of the data gathered on the COIN operations of Sorsogon 2nd Provincial Mobile Force Company in its area of operations. They were analyzed and interpreted in light of the insights from reading related literature and the result of the questionnaire with the key respondents.

Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations. This study evaluates the counter-insurgency operation in terms of Internal Security Operations, Intelligence Operations, and Police Community Affairs and development. Evaluating counterinsurgency operations involves assessing various aspects of the campaign's effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.

Internal Security Operations. Internal security involves maintaining peace within the boundaries of a sovereign state or self-governing territories, typically by enforcing national laws and safeguarding against internal security risks. The duty of ensuring internal security can vary, extending from police to paramilitary forces and, under extraordinary circumstances, even involving the military. Table 1 presents the internal security operations.

Table 1
Internal Security Operations

	PNP		BO		Former Rebels	
	WM	AI	WM	AI	WM	AI
1. Conduct of (1) Major Internal Security Operations (ISO)	3.65	HA	3.52	HA	2.63	A
2. Conduct of (2) Minor Internal Security Operations (ISO)	3.58	HA	3.50	HA	2.78	A
3. Participation in Peace, Law enforcement, and Development support (PLEDS) and Local Peace engagement (LPE) meetings	3.49	HA	2.30	A	2.55	A
4. Mobile Patrol	3.88	HA	3.24	A	3.50	HA
5. Checkpoint Operations	3.90	HA	3.56	HA	3.55	HA

6. Security operations and Monitoring of ongoing infrastructure development projects	3.55	HA	3.29	A	2.68	A
7. Conduct of Simulation exercises	3.56	HA	3.16	A	2.55	A

AWM

 Legend: 4-3.50 – 4.00-Highly Agree, 3-2.50 – 3.49-Agree, 2-1.50 – 2.49

-Moderately Agree, 1-1.00 – 1.49-Not Agree

The data provided by PNP respondents reveals varying levels of agreement across different aspects of police operations. Checkpoint Operations and Mobile Patrol received the highest weighted means, indicating a strong consensus among respondents regarding their effectiveness and importance in law enforcement. However, Participation in Peace, Law enforcement, and Development support (PLEDS) and Local Peace engagement (LPE) meetings received a slightly lower level of agreement, suggesting potential areas for improvement or differing opinions among respondents regarding their effectiveness. These findings highlight both strengths and potential areas for enhancement within police operations, underscoring the importance of considering stakeholder perceptions to continuously improve strategies and operations for better community service and protection.

Similarly, insights from Barangay Officials respondents provide a quantitative measure of agreement or disagreement regarding various operational activities. Checkpoint Operations and major internal security operations received high levels of agreement, indicating strong support for these activities among respondents. However, simulation exercises received a lower level of agreement, suggesting areas for improvement or differing opinions among respondents. While generally positive, these findings point to potential areas where attention or adjustments may be beneficial to align perceptions more closely with the effectiveness of operational activities. Furthermore, the data reveals former rebels' strongest endorsement for checkpoint operations and mobile patrols in upholding peace and security while also highlighting comparatively lower agreement levels regarding participation in peace-related meetings and simulation exercises, underscoring the need for potential enhancements or deeper examination to address any raised concerns or issues.

It highlights the imperative for sustained investment in capacity-building, training, and equipment for security forces engaged in Internal Security Operations. This implies a collective understanding of the need for continuous improvement, adaptation, and innovation in response to evolving threats and

challenges posed by insurgent groups. Overall, Internal Security Operations in counterinsurgency operations signify a shared commitment to safeguarding peace, stability, and prosperity within affected communities. It underscores the importance of coordinated and proactive measures to comprehensively address insurgency challenges while promoting social cohesion, resilience, and development at the grassroots level.

This is relevant to the study of Habib (2023); according to him, to conduct COIN, non-Western nations could adopt a different strategy and define success differently, emphasizing the military victory over the insurgency more than being population-friendly. This simply means that the 2nd PMFC may adopt an enemy-centric approach to toppling the leadership of the NPA, eventually leading to dismantling their guerrilla front in the area.

Intelligence Operations. Intelligence Operations are conducted worldwide to produce information essential to National security. This involves planning, directing, and supervising the collection of pertinent information and its subsequent conversion into useful intelligence for dissemination to both PNP operating units and higher authorities as a decision and policy-making process tool. Table 2 presents the intelligence operations of the counter-insurgency operations.

Table 2
Intelligence Operations

	PNP		BO		Former Rebels	
	WM	AI	WM	AI	WM	AI
1. Joint PNP-AFP Intelligence Driven Major ISO	3.70	HA	2.53	A	2.42	A
2. Joint PNP-AFP Intelligence Driven Minor ISO	3.78	HA	2.58	A	2.49	A
3. Communist Terrorist member Neutralized (Surrender)	3.61	HA	2.55	A	2.35	A
4. Counter-Intelligence operations	3.63	HA	3.30	A	3.39	A
5. Barangay Intelligence network (BINs) recruited	3.63	HA	3.35	A	3.15	A
AWM						

The data reveals distinct trends in the perceptions of different stakeholders

regarding counterinsurgency efforts. According to PNP respondents, joint intelligence-driven operations with the AFP receive significant support, particularly for minor and major internal security operations, suggesting a high level of agreement on their effectiveness. However, there are reservations regarding the surrender of communist terrorist members, indicating potential areas for refinement in strategy. Similarly, Barangay Officials perceive initiatives like the Barangay Intelligence Network (BINs) and counter-intelligence operations positively, but there's a more nuanced perspective on joint intelligence operations involving the 2nd PMFC, suggesting the need for further exploration to address specific challenges. Former rebels value counterintelligence operations and BIN recruitment highly but view efforts to encourage surrenders with less enthusiasm, suggesting room for improvement in strategies aimed at fostering defections. Overall, the data underscores the importance of intelligence-driven approaches in counterinsurgency efforts, highlighting the need for ongoing collaboration, refinement, and adaptation to effectively address insurgent threats.

The consensus among respondents regarding the effectiveness of intelligence operations carries significant implications for counterinsurgency strategy. It emphasizes the central role of intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination in preempting and neutralizing insurgent activities, highlighting the importance of multifaceted approaches and interagency collaboration. This collective acknowledgment underscores the imperative to invest in intelligence capabilities, including training, technology, and resource allocation, to enhance responsiveness and adaptability. Furthermore, the data underscores the importance of strategic partnerships and proactive measures in safeguarding peace and stability within affected communities, calling for continued efforts to fortify intelligence infrastructure and capacity. Ultimately, it signals a shared commitment among stakeholders to combat insurgency threats effectively, promoting peace, stability, and prosperity.

It shows a collective acknowledgment of the imperative to employ multifaceted intelligence approaches encompassing human intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source intelligence to comprehensively understand the insurgency landscape and proactively address emerging threats. Additionally, this shows the importance of fostering interagency collaboration and synergy in intelligence-sharing efforts, emphasizing the need for seamless coordination between law enforcement agencies, military units, local authorities, and communities to effectively disrupt insurgent networks and safeguard vulnerable populations. Furthermore, the agreement regarding the effectiveness of intelligence operations implies a shared commitment to sustaining investment in intelligence capabilities, including ongoing training, technological innovation, and resource allocation, to

continually enhance the responsiveness and adaptability of counterinsurgency measures. Ultimately, it serves as a clarion call for concerted efforts to fortify intelligence infrastructure and capacity, cultivate strategic partnerships, and maintain a proactive stance in combating insurgency threats, safeguarding peace, stability, and prosperity within affected communities.

Relatedly, the present government administration adopted and enhanced the program to convince the majority of members of the CPP- NPA to surrender, and this led to President Duterte signing Administrative Order No. 10, 2018, establishing the Enhanced Community Livelihood Integration Program (E-CLIP) for NPA rebels and Militia ng Bayan (MB) members who quit and surrender to the Philippine government. E-CLIP is a program for reintegration (Lupao & Cawi, 2019).

Similarly, Gberinyer et al. (2022) assert that the effective execution of the information-gathering phase for intelligence production, which involves employing various agents and tools such as informants, surveillance, information and communication technologies (ICT), community policing, and interrogation, underscores the critical importance of criminal intelligence management in the fight against crime.

Police Community Affairs and Development. Police-community relations is the relationship between the police and the communities they serve. Both officers and civilians in the community depend on these to be healthy and strong to preserve public safety and uphold justice. Its mission is to undertake Police Community Relations programs and activities in partnership with concerned government agencies, volunteer organizations, and the community to prevent crime and attain a safe and peaceful environment. Table 3 presents the Police Community Affairs and Development of counter-insurgency operations.

Table 3
Police Community Affairs and Development

	PNP		BO		Former Rebels		TWM	AI
	WM	AI	WM	AI	WM	AI		
1. Facilitated livelihood training and Seminar in partnership with different agencies and stakeholders	3.52	HA	3.54	HA	2.45	MA	3.17	A
2. Stratcom activities (Posting of infographics on social media)	3.84	HA	3.39	A	2.93	A	3.39	A

3.	Conducted information drive activities on Anti-Insurgency and EO 70	3.72	HA	3.35	A	2.53	A	3.20	A
4.	Community mobilization activity and community engagement with different sectors	3.54	HA	3.69	HA	2.96	A	3.40	A
5.	Co-opted CTG affected Mass organization	3.54	HA	3.00	A	2.23	MA	2.92	A
AWM								3.22	A

The data from PNP respondents provides insights into their perceptions of various counterinsurgency strategies, with social media-based Stratcom activities and information drives receiving high levels of agreement, indicating their effectiveness in countering insurgency narratives. However, facilitated livelihood training and seminars received a lower level of agreement, suggesting potential challenges in implementing such programs effectively. Similarly, Barangay Officials perceive community mobilization activities and livelihood interventions positively but show less enthusiasm towards co-opting Communist Terrorist Group (CTG) affected mass organizations, indicating areas for further exploration or improvement. Meanwhile, former rebels value community engagement and social media campaigns highly but express reservations about the effectiveness of co-opting CTG-affected mass organizations, calling for a deeper examination of potential limitations or challenges in implementing such strategies. Nevertheless, the unanimous agreement across all stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of Police Community Affairs and Development (PCAD) underscores its crucial role in fostering community resilience and trust, ultimately contributing to sustainable peace and security in insurgency-affected areas through community-oriented policing strategies.

The agreement on the effectiveness of PCAD reflects a shared recognition among respondents of the importance of community engagement and partnership-building in successful counterinsurgency operations. This validation underscores the significance of prioritizing community involvement and empowerment in designing and implementing counterinsurgency strategies. By fostering positive relationships between law enforcement agencies and local communities, PCAD initiatives can lead to enhanced intelligence gathering, increased public support, and ultimately, more effective counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, the unanimous agreement on the effectiveness of PCAD highlights its critical role in achieving sustainable peace and security, emphasizing the need for holistic approaches that prioritize community resilience and cooperation in countering insurgency

challenges. Overall, the data underscores the importance of community-oriented policing strategies and highlights the pivotal role of PCAD in fostering trust, cooperation, and collaboration between law enforcement agencies and local communities, ultimately contributing to enduring solutions to insurgency issues.

The paper of Sumad-on (2021) favored these findings in their recommendation that the police and military should convene to continuously ensure the provision of essential social services, as determined by the villagers through the barangay local government units, will enhance community-government relations while the government persists in countering insurgencies and terrorist activities carried out by the NPAs.

This correlates with the findings of Mabutot and Hermosa (2017), which indicate that the Boac PNP personnel demonstrate “Competent” community relations skills. As a result, they effectively establish a friendly rapport with the local community, promptly address referrals, and nurture mutual respect and trust between the PNP Organization and the community. This proactive approach has led to a decline in crime rates, bridging the communication divide and fostering harmony and mutual support between the PNP organization and the public, ultimately contributing to maintaining peace and order and preventing criminal activities.

Similarly, the study conducted by Sombrio and Branca (2017) reveals that the performance level of Police Community Relations is highly effective and well-implemented in preventing crimes and criminality. However, from the community’s viewpoint, these programs are only moderately effective in combating crimes. The community has proposed various programs to enhance Police Community Relations to ensure ongoing improvement in addressing crimes and criminality and maintaining peace and order within the locality.

Problems Encountered by the Sorsogon Second Provincial Mobile Force Company (2nd PMFC) in COIN Operations. Counterinsurgency operations can be incredibly complex and challenging, often presenting various problems for those involved. The problems encountered in this study describe Internal Security Operations, Intelligence Operations, and Police Community Affairs and Development.

Internal Security Operations. The delineation of areas of operation between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) stands out as the top problem encountered in Internal Security Operations (ISO). This issue underscores the critical importance of clearly defining and coordinating the respective roles and jurisdictions of the AFP and PNP in counterinsurgency efforts. Without well-defined boundaries, overlapping areas of operation can lead to confusion, inefficiencies, and even conflicts between the

two security forces.

The second significant problem encountered in Internal Security Operations (ISO) is the inadequacy of communication equipment to connect operating troops to the 2nd PMFC. Effective communication infrastructure facilitates real-time coordination, situational awareness, and decision-making processes during ISO missions. Without reliable communication equipment, operating troops may face challenges in relaying critical information, receiving orders, and coordinating responses to emerging threats.

Intelligence Operations. Identifying cyber security issues, particularly online recruitment and radicalization, as the top problems in intelligence operations underscores a significant challenge in countering insurgency threats. In today's digital age, insurgent groups leverage the internet and social media platforms for recruitment, propaganda dissemination, and radicalization efforts, exploiting the anonymity and reach of online platforms to advance their agendas. These cyber security challenges present multifaceted obstacles to intelligence operations, making monitoring and disrupting insurgent activities in the virtual realm difficult.

The decentralized nature of online recruitment and radicalization efforts poses challenges in identifying and neutralizing individuals susceptible to extremist ideologies, as insurgents exploit encrypted communication channels and employ sophisticated online tactics to evade detection. Additionally, the rapid dissemination of propaganda and misinformation online exacerbates the spread of extremist narratives and fuels radicalization, further complicating efforts to counter insurgent recruitment efforts. Addressing cyber security issues requires a multifaceted approach, including enhanced monitoring and analysis of online activities, collaboration with internet service providers and social media platforms, and strategic counter-messaging campaigns to challenge extremist narratives and promote alternative perspectives. Furthermore, intelligence agencies must invest in cyber security capabilities, including advanced technologies and analytical tools, to effectively identify and mitigate cyber threats posed by insurgent groups.

In addition, identifying unserviceable Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) equipment, such as drones, as the top second problem in intelligence operations highlights a critical obstacle in countering insurgency threats. ISR capabilities play a crucial role in gathering real-time intelligence, monitoring insurgent activities, and enhancing situational awareness, making the maintenance and functionality of such equipment paramount. The presence of unserviceable drones and other ISR equipment impedes the ability to conduct reconnaissance missions, gather actionable intelligence, and track insurgent movements effectively. This deficiency not only compromises operational

effectiveness but also jeopardizes the safety of personnel and civilians by limiting the ability to detect and respond to insurgent threats promptly.

Police Community Affairs and Development. The top problem within Police Community Affairs and Development (PCAD) initiatives is the need for continued training of personnel. PCAD is pivotal in fostering community trust, addressing grievances, and countering insurgent influence through proactive engagement. However, without ongoing training programs, personnel may lack the necessary skills and competencies to effectively execute PCAD strategies. Continued training is essential to keep PCAD personnel abreast of evolving community dynamics, emerging security challenges, and best practices in community policing.

This includes enhancing communication skills, conflict resolution techniques, cultural sensitivity, and understanding of local contexts. Additionally, training should focus on promoting a community-oriented mindset, emphasizing the importance of building relationships, fostering dialogue, and collaborating with community stakeholders. Investing in the professional development of PCAD personnel ensures they remain equipped to navigate complex social landscapes, build meaningful connections with residents, and address issues that undermine community security and cohesion. By prioritizing continued training, PCAD can enhance its effectiveness in promoting stability, countering insurgency threats, and fostering positive police-community relations.

Moreover, the lack of computers emerges as the second pressing challenge. Computers are indispensable tools for managing data, facilitating communication, and conducting administrative tasks crucial for effective community engagement and outreach efforts. The absence of adequate computer resources severely limits the scope and efficiency of PCAD initiatives, hindering the ability to organize, analyze, and disseminate information pertinent to community development programs. Without access to computer technology, PCAD personnel may struggle to efficiently coordinate activities, track community interactions, and monitor progress towards community-oriented objectives. Additionally, the lack of computers impedes the implementation of digital communication strategies, which are increasingly integral to engaging diverse community stakeholders and promoting transparency in PCAD operations.

About this, PRO5 CMC no 23-2023 provides in its concept of operations that, In a whole-of-government- and people-centric approach, the support to the existing mechanisms of all NTF ELCAC clusters and to utilize them as vehicles for coordination and collaboration will delegitimize and defeat the CTGs, is support system, and structures thru the DILG RCSP, PNP R-PSB, and enhancement of Community and service-oriented policing.

Similarly, in Kissorio's study (2022), the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing is found to hinge on a comprehensive understanding of the criminal environment facilitated by thorough crime intelligence. The study recommends that the Directorate bolster its human resources by recruiting additional detectives to strengthen crime prevention efforts. Additionally, the suggestion underscores the importance of the government allocating additional resources to train law enforcement officers, specifically focusing on enhancing their proficiency in surveillance and intelligence gathering. These measures are crucial components in the proactive prevention of crime.

Furthermore, Scheepers and Schultz (2019) uncovered that significant stages in organizational learning encompass preparation, contribution, and outcomes, with managerial, organizational, personal, and work-related categories identified as specific levels for implementing organizational learning. The notable contribution to the knowledge base lies in developing a flow diagram delineating the distinct stages and levels of the organizational learning process within Crime Intelligence. This diagram aims to enhance the dissemination of knowledge, aiding in the anticipation, prevention, and monitoring of criminal activities to combat crime more effectively.

The National Task Force on Police Reforms in Kenya has pinpointed significant deficiencies within the Kenya Police Service, primarily centered on its inadequate resources and failure to meet societal expectations. The service is considered ill-equipped and unprepared for its responsibilities, lacking essential resources such as vehicles and modern crime-fighting tools. This inadequacy may have led to higher crime rates, increased victimization, heightened social costs associated with crime, and a rise in casualties among police officers themselves. Consequently, there is a growing perception among the public that if the police cannot ensure their own safety, they may struggle to effectively protect citizens (Anderson, 2017).

Proposed Counterinsurgency Framework for Sustainable Development.

In response to the persistent threat of insurgency, the proposed counterinsurgency operations aim to address the multifaceted challenges of insurgent groups and promote long-term peace, stability, and development in affected regions. Insurgency remains a significant security concern globally, characterized by asymmetric warfare tactics, ideological extremism, and a complex network of support structures. In many cases, insurgent groups exploit local grievances, socioeconomic disparities, and governance deficits to garner support and undermine government authority. Recognizing the need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach, the proposed counterinsurgency operations seek to address the root causes of insurgency while simultaneously neutralizing insurgent

capabilities and restoring government legitimacy.

The proposed counterinsurgency framework and the results of the study are intricately connected, as the framework aims to guide strategic planning and operational implementation to address insurgency challenges, while the study provides valuable insights into stakeholder perceptions and the effectiveness of various counterinsurgency strategies and activities. Firstly, the results of the study offer empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness and perceived strengths and weaknesses of different counterinsurgency strategies and activities. This data can inform the development and refinement of the proposed framework by highlighting areas of success and areas for improvement. Furthermore, the results of the study help validate or adjust the priorities and focus areas outlined in the proposed counterinsurgency framework. Similarly, the study highlights challenges or reservations regarding certain aspects of counterinsurgency efforts, such as surrender programs or co-opting CTG-affected organizations; the framework needs to reassess its approach in these areas to address concerns raised by stakeholders and ensure alignment with their perceptions and priorities.

Overall, the connection between the proposed counterinsurgency framework and the results of the study is essential for ensuring that counterinsurgency strategies are evidence-based, responsive to stakeholder needs and perceptions, and effectively address the complex challenges posed by insurgency. By integrating insights from the study into the framework development process, policymakers and military planners can enhance the relevance, effectiveness, and legitimacy of their counterinsurgency efforts, ultimately contributing to greater stability, security, and peace in affected regions.

The success of counterinsurgency efforts hinges on the synergy between military, law enforcement, and civilian agencies, as well as active engagement with local communities and stakeholders. By integrating security operations with governance reforms, development initiatives, and strategic communication campaigns, the proposed operations aim to degrade insurgent capabilities, win hearts and minds, and undermine the appeal of insurgent ideologies. Moreover, fostering trust, collaboration, and cooperation among government agencies, security forces, and local populations is paramount to effectively countering insurgency threats and building resilient communities capable of resisting extremist influences.

In this context, the proposed counterinsurgency operations prioritize a holistic and nuanced approach that addresses the underlying grievances fueling the insurgency, strengthens institutional capacity, and promotes inclusive governance. Emphasizing the principles of legitimacy, proportionality, and respect for human rights, the operations seek to uphold the rule of law, protect civilian

populations, and promote social cohesion. Additionally, leveraging technological advancements, intelligence gathering, and strategic planning enables security forces to adapt to evolving threats, anticipate insurgent tactics, and effectively disrupt insurgent networks.

Ultimately, the success of the proposed counterinsurgency operations rests on the commitment, collaboration, and resilience of all stakeholders involved. By fostering unity of effort, building trust with local communities, and addressing the root causes of insurgency, the operations aim to create an environment conducive to sustainable peace, prosperity, and development. Through collective action and strategic coordination, we can overcome the challenges posed by insurgency and pave the way for a brighter and more secure future for all.

CONCLUSIONS

The 2nd PMFC operates within a strong legal framework and possesses ample resources to execute effective counterinsurgency operations in Sorsogon province. With legal mandates, well-trained personnel, adequate budget allocations, and logistical support, the 2nd PMFC conducts intelligence gathering, law enforcement, community engagement, and capacity-building activities. This positions them as key players in addressing insurgency threats and maintaining peace. Respondents express unanimous confidence in the effectiveness of the 2nd PMFC's strategies, highlighting their crucial role in safeguarding communities and upholding the rule of law. However, the study also identifies challenges inherent in counterinsurgency operations, necessitating strategic planning, resource allocation, and stakeholder collaboration to overcome. A proposed counterinsurgency framework emphasizes an enemy-centric approach, community engagement, and technological advancements to neutralize threats, address root causes, and foster sustainable peace and development. This comprehensive strategy holds promise for countering insurgency and advancing peace, stability, and security in affected areas. Furthermore, the proposed counterinsurgency framework, informed by the results of the study, emphasizes the importance of leveraging community engagement and intelligence-driven operations to effectively combat insurgency challenges. Building upon stakeholder perceptions of effective strategies such as social media-based information dissemination and joint intelligence efforts with the AFP, the framework prioritizes proactive approaches that foster collaboration between law enforcement agencies, military

forces, and local communities. By integrating evidence-based insights from the study, the framework seeks to enhance the responsiveness, effectiveness, and legitimacy of counterinsurgency efforts, ultimately contributing to greater peace, stability, and security in insurgency-affected areas.

TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH

The findings of this study could be translated into an action plan focusing on counterinsurgency to tackle the urgent issues faced; this will be promoted through a wide range of institutional and educational initiatives. Implementing this sustainable development framework will help the PNP and the local community.

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