

## **Polyfacetic Masks of Corruption: Typologies, Categories, Forms and Levels**

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### **ABSTRACT**

This paper is aimed to analyze the multiple forms and faces of corruption, its typology and levels. After reading this paper, readers should have a clear idea about what is corruption and how corruption is classified in different ways. The analysis begins reviewing a typology categorizing political corruption, economic corruption and public administration corruption and showing some examples of typologies, establishing the levels of corruption and indicating where it can be encountered. It is concluded that corruption is just as multifaceted concept as there are societies and economic and political systems, embracing from the broad concept of corruption to the narrow legal concept of bribery. However, it is difficult to assess the overall levels of corruption phenomena based on empirical or perceived data which do not reflect the realities of corruption world.

*Keywords* - Corruption, forms of corruption, levels of corruption

## INTRODUCTION

Corruption is a social disease that entails social injustice that plagues many developing countries today. Corruption is just as multifaceted concept as there are societies and economic and political systems that embrace from the broad concept of corruption to the narrow legal concept of bribery.

Corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain and the abuse of public power for private benefit. A well known definition of corruption is made by the World Bank which considers it is the abuse of public office for personal gain. Transparency international also defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. “Corruption, while being tied particularly to bribery, is a general term covering misuse of authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary” (Bayley, 1966; Alemann 1989, p. 858). Corruption has been broadly defined as the misuse of public office for private gain and the abuse of entrusted power. Corruption is a behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role.

In defining corruption it should be addressed if all forms of corruption are the same regardless of the levels. Also it should be considered if the differences in form and consequences of grand corruption and petty corruption can be treated in the same manner. All forms of corruption are based on the potential conflict between the individual’s professional and personal interests and values. However, to find out the causes of different forms of corruption proves to be a difficult task.

Corruption can be conceptualized as a model of a cycle of at least seven steps. The exchange logic of corruption is formed by the following 7 components of corruption.

1. The buyer (the person offering the bribe: the corrupter) wants
2. a rare good (an order, license, or position) which
3. the seller (the person to be bribed: the corruptee) can assign. The latter receives
4. an additional incentive (money or payment in kind) for the assignment above the normal price. The corruptee thereby
5. violates generally accepted moral standards and
6. damages the interests of a third party or competitor and/or the public interest.
7. Therefore corruption is hidden and concealed.

Pedersen and Johannsen (2008) have developed a model to analyze five different interactions of corruption shown in figure 1. The five interactions are: Private buys influence from public, corruption within and between public, public extorts private, an exit strategy from public to private and corruption within and between private.




Figure 1: Types of corruption – a simple view

Source: Own elaboration based on Pedersen and Johannsen (2008)

## OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The paper aimed to provide a comprehensive discussion of typologies categories, forms and levels of corruption.

## METHODOLOGY

The paper uses the descriptive design involving a meta-analysis of literature on graft and corruption.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Typologies of Corruption

Because there is no universally accepted definition of corruption, there is no universally valid typology of corruption. Researchers on corruption have elaborated multiple classifications. Weber (1964) developed a typology of corruption on the basis of subjective intentions that have or expect the individuals such as gaining power and influence, economic and business success, self-enrichment, social motives, opportunism, etc. Weber (1964) assumes that corruption is a State centered phenomenon reflecting the malfunctioning of a rationalized bureaucracy acting according to rules and in the public interest of society reflected in a democratic political system.

Table 1 shows the main typologies, categories, forms and levels of corruption covered in this analysis.

Table 1: Typologies, categories, forms and levels of corruption

Typologies	Categories	Forms	Types
A. Model of Pedersen and Johanssen (2008).	1) Political corruption 2) Economic corruption 3) Public administration corruption	a) Private buys influence from public. b) Corruption within and between public. Public extorts private. c) An exit strategy from public to private. d) Corruption within and between private.	1) Grand corruption/ Administrative malpractice. 2) Administrative malpractice. 3) 'Day-to-day' corruption
	1) Administrative corruption 2) Political influence 3) State capture		

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Bribery</li> <li>b) Collusion</li> <li>c) Embezzlement and</li> <li>d) Theft</li> <li>e) Fraud</li> <li>f) Extortion</li> <li>g) Abuse of discretion</li> <li>h) Favoritism, gift-giving, nepotism, clientele and financing networks of cronyism and patronage.</li> <li>i) Improper political contributions.</li> </ul>	
B. Corruption typology of Roebuck and Barker (1974)			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Corruption of authority</li> <li>2) Kickbacks</li> <li>3) Opportunistic theft</li> <li>4) Shakedown</li> <li>5) Protection of illegal activities</li> <li>6) The fix</li> <li>7) Direct criminal activities, and</li> <li>8) Internal payoffs</li> </ul>
C. Corruption typology of Heidenheimer (1989)			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) White corruption</li> <li>2) Gray corruption</li> <li>3) Black corruption</li> </ul>
D. Corruption typology of Alemann (1995)			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Low level corruption</li> <li>2) Top level corruption</li> <li>3) Petty corruption</li> <li>4) Routine corruption</li> <li>5) Aggravated corruption</li> </ul>
E. Way Corruption typology of Punch (2000)			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Corruption</li> <li>2) Misconduct</li> <li>3) Police crime</li> </ul>

<p>F. Typology of corruption in privatization of state owned companies Tserendondov (2001)</p>			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) taking state assets</li> <li>2) Using their current position and authority to influence.</li> <li>3) Bankrupting state owned enterprises.</li> <li>4) The law is breached by privatizing</li> </ol>
<p>G. Corruption typology of Miller (2003)</p>			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Individual</li> <li>2) Organized,</li> <li>3) Internally networked</li> </ol>
<p>H. Corruption typology of Skogan and Meares (2004)</p>			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Proactive vs. reactive</li> <li>2) Personal gain vs. organizational gain ('noble-cause' corruption)</li> </ol>
<p>I. Corruption typology of Pedersen and Johannsen (2008)</p>			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Petty corruption</li> <li>2) Grand corruption</li> </ol>
<p>J. Corruption typology of Baker (2005).</p>			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Traditional government corruption,</li> <li>2) Criminal corruption,</li> <li>3) Entrepreneurial governmental corruption</li> </ol>
<p>K. Typology of Cahn and Gambino (2008)</p>			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Category 0. Higher levels of corruption.</li> <li>2) Category 1 Opportunities for corruption.</li> <li>3) Category 2 Decreasing corruption</li> <li>4) Category 3. Lower levels of corruption.</li> </ol>

L. Corruption typology of Merat and Roth Deubel (2008). Gretchen and Levitsky (2006),			1) Formal 2) Informal
M. Corruption typology of Transparency International (TI) UK			1) Framework for defense

Source: Own elaboration.

Corruption can be active or passive behavior taking into consideration who is the person that has the power of decision making or to whom is requested. According to the model of Pedersen and Johannsen (2008), corruption also can be private among particular individuals and public corruption that takes place in the public sphere of politics and government administration. A basic categorization based on this model considers political corruption, economic corruption and public administration corruption.

### ***A. Political corruption***

Political corruption results in gaining political power. There is political corruption when the behaviors deviate from the principles that guide politics and policies, adapting decisions with abuse of power, which means that the private interests displace the public and common interests. Power is used to service the private interest. It would help readers understand better if you add some examples here.

### ***B. Economic corruption***

Economic corruption is the “sale of public office for a private gain” as defined by Ali and Isse (2003:449). Economic corruption can be defined as the sacrifice of the principal’s interest for the agent’s interest. To explain more plainly, the principal is the owner of resources such as the capitalist and the agent is his/her manager. The manager can have opportunities to take advantage for his/her own

benefit from using resources that belong to the capitalist or the owner of such resources. Economic corruption results in making profits.

The behaviors of two principals or owners, one of which is corrupting and a corrupted agent or manager are analyzed in terms of high costs and benefits using a principal-agent model of corruption framed on neo-institutional economics. Groenendijk (1997) found that the corrupting manager was gaining the more benefits in more of the actions analyzed to the cost and taking advantage of the not corrupting principal. This situation describes a nearly zero sum game where one principal gains what the other principal losses.

Economic corruption has implications of determining the loss of income. Ali and Isse (2003:449) have attempted to elaborate on determinants of economic corruption to explain cross-country differences. Some determinants analyzed were education, size of government, judicial efficiency, political and economic freedom, ethnicity, foreign aid, type of the political regime, etc. Some findings support that corruption is positively correlated with foreign aid and the size of government. Foreign aid exacerbates the negative effect of government expenditure on growth. There is a negative correlation between corruption and the level of education, judicial efficiency, and economic freedom. Institutional development, efficient legal systems, educational measures, decentralized government and less dependence on foreign aid, discourages economic corruption.

Good examples of how and how much economic corruption affects the principal, the agent, the state, the consumer, the economy, etc. are the following. Weak structures and governments of state institutions not controlling their agencies are more prone to experience high levels of corruption, more costly and distortionary to economic development (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Corruption in public administration and consumer fraud are common practices that hurt the economies and consumption of families in countries in transition as reported by Zvekcic (1998). Rations of essential consumer goods given by government to the poor people may be administered by corrupt officials, so to have access the poor have to pay a bribe (Bardhan, 1997).

Economic corruption impedes economic development and commerce. Getz and Volkema, (2011) found a negative relationship between economic adversity was positively related to corruption and corruption was inversely related to wealth.



### ***C. Public administration corruption***

Public administration corruption is a denotation of economic corruption used in the context of public organizations and institutions that ordinarily refers to the use of public office for private gains. In the administrative corruption the behaviors of public agents neglect the principles of efficiency, truthfulness and rightfulness. The bureaucrat, public servant or public official (the agents) is entrusted with carrying out a task by an elected politician or/and by the public (the principals). The agents may engage in some sort of corrupted actions and malfeasance for private enrichment which may be difficult to monitor for the principal (Bardhan, 1997).

Public administration corruption is different to political corruption in relation to the behaviors of corrupting actors and agents. Bureaucrats and public servants working in public administration are the corrupting actors and agents in public management while elected politicians are the corrupting actors in political corruption. Bardhan (1997) sustains that political corruption refers to the ill-gotten gains measured primarily in terms of political power. Public administration corruption behavior results in transfer of public benefits to private benefits taking advantage of the entrusted power, as for example, in the form of nepotism that results in the transfer of benefits from society to family members.

Nepotism is related to kin favoritism behaviors to benefit family members such as hiring relatives for the better jobs. It has been suggested by Wennerås and Wold (2013) that a close analysis based on actual peer-reviewer scores for postdoctoral fellowship applications in Sweden, benefits relatives of peer-reviewers providing direct evidence that the system is subject to nepotism. This form of corruption is protected by a policy of secrecy in evaluation. Nepotism is a favor-seeking culturally rooted and rent-seeking decision making behaviors to benefit own family members, relatives and friends. Su, and Littlefield (2001) have identified different rules of maneuvering *guanxi* in mainland China and the ethical dilemmas related. However, hiring family members as a practice of nepotism has a functional or dysfunctional impact on family-owned businesses depending on practices and policies.

### ***D. Administrative corruption***

Administrative corruption as a form of corruption refers to the implementation of existing laws, regulations, and decrees. The role that political and upper level administrative corruption have come to play in contributing to the profound and

enduring malaise for societies, States and firms alike. Administrative corruption for example, spreads if corrupt officials have to pay an entry fee and have to resort to other citizens to finance the entry fee, allowing to additional groups of voters to have a stake in corruption.

Combating administrative corruption has been approached by reforming public administration and public finance management.

### ***E. Political influence***

A new type of corruption, referred as uninstitutionalized political influence (Scott, 1972) was directly generated from the rise of new groups of wealth and power during modernization (Huntington, 1968) and their efforts to make themselves effective in politics in a political system that was slow to provide legitimate channels. The modernization theory on corruption derived in the hypothesis to sustain that the more rapidly a country modernizes, the higher the level of corruption. The process of modernization in developing countries contributed to generate high levels of corruption through the expansion of governmental activities, the rise of a new rich social class seeking political influence and change of social values and norms (Huntington, 1968 and Scott, 1972).

Political influence allows private individuals to help shape public law and depends on the size of the firm and interactions with state officials, rather than direct payments (Al-Jurf, 1999:193, 198). The judiciary, legislative and executive systems may be weak to political influence. Political influences can buy the decisions of the legislative, executive and judiciary actors even in a party system. Victims of a corrupted legislative, judiciary or executive systems lacking of political influence make illicit offerings to gain access to public goods, government jobs and resources. Political influence of the higher-rank officials can be modeled as a function of their revenues from collecting relatives. There are some models to capture large political influences such as the lobbying models and the probabilistic voting models which analyses contributions of small group voters.

### ***E. State capture***

State capture is defined by the World Bank as “The actions of individuals, groups, or firms, both in the public and private sectors, to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies to their

own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials” (Helman, 2000). State capture as a form of corruption surrounds the formation of laws, regulations, and policies. One form of state capture is decision altering which encompasses bribes and promises of bribes to alter or affect decisions, affect policy formulation and formation of laws, regulations, or decrees in order to benefit the bribing person or entity.

State capture is also a phenomenon of undue influence and capture of the State by powerful firms. The extent, level and degree of State capture and monopolistic vested interests vary significantly across countries. Firms engaged in illicit influence experienced higher growth rates than firms that did not engage in this form of corruption (Kaufmann& Kraay, 2002; Helman, 2000). Where state capture is a major constraint for multinational and domestic firms as a whole, they suffer by growing more slowly while the firms that are purchasing laws and regulations obtain higher benefits and growth faster and higher.

Generally, state capture cannot be abolished by democratic institutions. State capture has been associated with corruption and lobbying literature with campaign expenditures which are linked to policy outcomes (Grossman and Helpman 2001).

State capture and administrative corruption are identified as significant issues to be confronted by transitional economies. The character of corruption matters with respect to the functioning of the political, economic and administrative system. Corruption in different forms and areas, state capture and distrust are mutually reinforcing and may be prevalent to differing degrees depending on the specific State. Countries in economic transition with high levels of both forms of corruption, administrative and state capture are associated with output decline, poverty, inequality, and even organized criminal activity (The World Bank, 2000). This report recognizes that the state capture poses formidable challenges, status quo often benefits powerful interests and the political economy of anticorruption initiatives has proven complex and difficult. The institutional vacuum in countries with transitional economies provided ideal opportunities for state capture.

### **3. Forms of Corruption**

Taking into consideration the magnitude of corruption, corruption can be grand corruption or petty corruption; it can be individual or systemic corruption.

Some examples of forms of corruption are bribery, collusion, embezzlement of public funds and theft, fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion, favoritism, clienteles,

nepotism, the sale of government property by public officials, patronage, etc.

### ***A. Bribery.***

Bribery is the most widespread form of corruption. Bribery is driven by lucrative profits and the giving of some form of benefit to unduly influence some action or decision on the part of the recipient or beneficiary. Bribery provides incentives for over-regulation and over-bureaucratization of procedures. Bribery is likely representing the transfer of a portion of rent to government officials. Bribery is committed when a public servant is offered, promised, or granted an in return for an action already carried out or is to be expected. Bribery can be initiated by the person soliciting the bribe or the person offering the bribe.

The benefits may vary from money or other valuables to less tangible ones such as inside information or employment. Bribery as illegal action of corrupt relationships is conducted between the involved expending time and resources to keep their secret out of risk and instability that harms reputations when a word ultimately leaks.

Jurists have developed a typology of bribery. Bribery as a form of corruption can be active or passive, in public office or in business relationships. The different types of bribes have different impacts, depending of the level that can be from tempting of individual politicians to political landscape conservation of factions and parties. A big bribe can be from an extraordinarily high one time payments for a specific purpose to impact donations to influence future decisions.

There are some circumstances that are conducive to bribery, including the amount of discretion that civil servants are able to exercise, a legal system that fails to punish bribery, and private companies that are willing to pay the costs of doing business (Al-Jurf, 1999) Bribery also can be a characteristic of the vacuum of political power caused by weak legal institutions. Bribery becomes a part of the normal course of business after a firm makes some payments because bureaucrats worldwide expected similar treatment. Bribes may be paid on a case-by-case basis or as part of an ongoing relationship.

### ***B. Collusion.***

Some behaviors of corrupt collusions lead to the submission of the flow of information within an economic, societal or political unit. Contractual collusion between two parties A and B can be arranged to convert a non tradable contractual condition. For example, a non tradable such as safety conditions can be arranged

in contractual terms into a tradable goods. By this conversion, one or both parties earn a rent over and above normal profits. Corruption can be collusive in nature where individuals escape official regulations or sanctions by paying bribes to officials. Because of a contractual collusion, consumer C suffers an externality through an unperceived drop in safety.

There are some differences and implications between bribery and collusion. Collusion between several economic agents may be difficult because the driving a bribe competition between providers tends to lower the level of bribes, finally discouraging the officials to ask for a bribe. For example, a citizen requesting a passport, he can go elsewhere to obtain it if an officer asks for a bribe. Klitgaard (1990) refers that quasi-independent and autonomous government agencies have the power to authorize or stop an investment project, and may use it to set bribes either colluding or without collusion with other governmental or independent agencies.

An owner (principal) may have to compensate (bribe) the manager (agent) for the expected value if collusion is allowed. In this case, the reward or bribe is a device for avoiding collusion. If the principal or owner has to deter collusion of a manager with somebody else, like for example, an auditor, it is costly. The owner has to reward both the manager and the auditor for refusing a bribe. One difference may be that the profits of the principal (owner) are lower because he/she has to compensate (bribe) or reward the agent (manager) in order to discourage him from colluding with somebody else. However, when the bribe is higher than the punishment to the manager colluding, bribery becomes costly and unprofitable. Thus, collusion may be optimal to the principal and may be managed to be optimal in different environments.

Collusion among competing firms may assume the differences in the costs of bribery and may focus on the differences in the roles played by bribery. However, enforcing collusion in oligopoly for profit maximization is related to enforce bribe collection. Thus, enforcing collusion may be essential to punish excessive bribes. Detected price-cutting can be punished severely driving to bribe increases and collusive bribe maximization (Stigler, 1964).

### ***C. Embezzlement and theft.***

These are forms of corruption characterized by the taking or conversion of money, property or other valuables for personal benefit. Embezzlement often happens by colluding with the subcontractors who are employed for performing some services such as the maintenance work. Officials can have a source of revenue

if they embezzle money from the budget for financing the maintenance work, for example. Embezzlement and theft involve the taking of property by someone to whom it has been entrusted. In the aggregate, this represents embezzlement of state revenues of the first order.

#### ***D. Fraud.***

Fraud consists of the use of misleading information to induce someone to turn over the property voluntarily, such as the case of misrepresenting the amount of people in need of a particular service. Also other typical fraudulent practice is the sales-buy relationships between public and private sectors. It is well known the form of corruption based on fraudulent sales of second hand or surplus equipment, but when the buyer is the public sector there is no attempt to include the extent of fraud within the private sector.

#### ***E. Extortion.***

Extortion involves coercive incentives such as the use of threat of violence or the exposure or damaging information in order to induce cooperation. The typical extortion is a small scale bribery such to pay to pass security check points or the soliciting of money by low level official where the office holders can be either the instigators or the victims of extortion. Under the form of extortion clients and consumers of government or public services have to pay bribes in addition to the official price, license, permits, and access to facilities, etc. As a form of political corruption prevalent in many settings, politicians and public officials make extortions to smaller and weaker firms.

#### ***F. Abuse of discretion.***

Abuse of discretion is concerning abuses and corrupt government agency practices for private gain without external inducement or extortion. The administrative structure system functioning from high national levels through to the local levels is established by corrupt governments premised on enabling state agents to comprehensively abuse citizen rights for their own personal benefits and in complicity that of their partners and extended network. Some politicians and public officials abuse their political power to capture natural resource rents in such sectors as the mining sector, for example.

In some societies, the combination of acceptance in the face of entrenched systems of abuse has become the norm. Human rights abuses are associated with economic exploitation taking place in areas under the control of the armed opposition and their foreign backers. The history of colonial societies during the last centuries has provided ample examples of how the unprincipled exploitation of natural resources can give rise to human rights abuses also and it has demonstrated how corruption or the mismanagement of natural resources can undermine a country's development and hence the social and economic rights of their citizens. Government officials, who are the perpetrators of human rights abuses shielded on the impunity of the rule of law, address the endemic problems of corruption and resource and financial mismanagement to gain benefits exploited as effectively as possible to the tangible benefit of the population as a whole.

At the global and international levels, the comprehensive and systematic abuse of power and authority on global and international laws, standards and norms for all aspects of national level are striking. Patterns of such abuses are usually associated with bureaucracies in which broad individual discretion is created and few oversights or accountability structures are present. Also these abuses of office's discretion are related to complex decision-making rules which are capable to neutralize the effectiveness of such structures.

Abuses of natural public resources, asset confiscation and forfeiture by governments, law enforcement agencies and political appointees are so egregious that the assets are sold in fake actions to relatives and friends of prominent politicians, party hacks, etc. at bargain prices. The ruling political parties are potentially more likely to have members who are in positions where they would be able to abuse public resources. Common types of abuses in privatization of state owned enterprises are bankrupting them and assigning a lower value than the real estimate.

### ***G. Favoritism, gift-giving, nepotism, clienteles and financing networks of cronyism and patronage.***

As forms of corruption, these actions involve abuse of discretion, although the act is governed not by the direct self-interest of the corrupt individual, but by some less tangible affiliation, such as advancing the interest of family or nepotism, a political party, or of an ethnic, religious or other grouping. The incidence of corruption practices such as gift-giving and nepotism increased "not as much the result of the deviance of behavior from accepted norms as it is the

deviance of norms from the established patterns of behavior” (Huntington 1968, p.60). Citizens follow informal institutions and rules and corrupt practices such as bribery and nepotism to obtain public benefits, goods and services, where they are signaled by mistrust in the transparency and efficaciousness of state institutions.

There are some countries where public sector institutions are historically based on patronage and nepotism rather than merit, and the consequences may be different. Nepotism increases public employment as a substitute for deficient public works (Bayley, 1966) Per capita higher income of individuals relieves family obligations and lowers the incidence of nepotism. Nepotism subverts laws promoting equity in the workforce and usually increasing the gender inequality.

Other form of corruption is clienteles where are exchanged votes for managerial decisions related to individual and collective goods, mainly for infrastructure o equipment such as roads, schools, etc. Ethnic based patron-clienteles and prebendalism, gives officeholders and bureaucrats the opportunity to make official decisions as vehicles for rewarding political support and contribute to personal or clan enrichment (Joseph, 1987). Well established networks of clienteles always as the result of inequality and in-group trust, have to be controlled more intensively.

#### ***H. Improper political contributions.***

These are payments made in an attempt to unduly influence present or future activities by a party or its members when they are in office. To distinguish this from legitimate political contributions is very difficult. The political economy literature explains distortions due to the influence of special political interest groups (Coate and Morris, 1995). Some forms of corruption and venal behaviors can be categorized as improper political contributions such as acceleration or facilitation fees for the provision of goods, services or the divulging of information; information altering fees to subvert the flow of truth and complete information and the selling of permits; income supplement of the provider without affecting the real world; relocation fees are benefits paid to affect the allocation of economic resources, material wealth and the rights such as concessions, licenses, permits, tenders awarded, assets privatized, etc.

The perception of corruption influences the political and economic behavior of citizens in actions such as voting or investment decisions (Treisman, 2000, p. 400). The term “the grabbing hand” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) describes rent-seeking governments which are constrained only by the political and economic institutions in their countries. Ades and Di Tella (1999:987) found



that political rights consistently had no significant effect on corruption. An empirical study conducted by Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003) examine the direct relationship between political institutions and corruption and found that proportional electoral systems are likely to have higher corruption levels.

## **II. Examples of some typologies of corruption**

### ***A. Corruption typology of Roebuck and Barker (1974)***

Roebuck and Barker (1974) postulates an empirical typology of police corruption derived from a content analysis of the literature published during 1960-1972 and the police work experience. Police corruption is analyzed as a form of organizational deviance hinging primarily on informal police peer group norms. The types of police corruption delineated are:

- 1) Corruption of authority
- 2) Kickbacks
- 3) Opportunistic theft
- 4) Shakedowns
- 5) Protection of illegal activities
- 6) The fix
- 7) Direct criminal activities, and
- 8) Internal payoffs

These types are analyzed along the dimensions of acts and actors, norm violations, support from peer group, organizational degree of deviant practices, and police department's reactions. Contradictions among formal norms, informal norms, and situational rules are indicated.

### ***B. Corruption typology of Heidenheimer (1989)***

Heidenheimer (1989:149 ff.) distinguishes three different evaluations of corruption in society:

- 1) White corruption: Corrupt behavior is coded tolerantly. This is typically the case in traditional family based system as well as in patron-client based systems.

- 2) Grey corruption: Corruption is regarded with some opprobrium. Corruption is reprehensible in public moral standards, but the affected persons are widely missing a consciousness of doing wrong. This is typical for modern constitutional states and states in transition towards democratic political culture.
- 3) Black corruption: Corruption is generally regarded as severe violation of community moral and legal norms. This type of corruption is one of the characteristics attributed to some modern democratic media societies.

### ***C. Corruption typology of Alemann (1995)***

Corruption in societies is inevitable, being a part of informal politics or shadow politics is ranging from a grey area of completely normal informal agreements and regulations to the black area of illegal and unlawful corruption and organized crime. Corruption is the extreme black side of a scale of informal politics. To describe this point, Alemann (1995) suggests the term shadow politics. It is hardly to determine, and it is extremely difficult to fix, at what point grey behavior of informal politics turns to black corruption, such as for example, a smile is not a bribe.

Alemann (1995) proposed the following types of corruption in his typology:

- 1) low level corruption
- 2) top level corruption
- 3) petty corruption
- 4) routine corruption
- 5) aggravated corruption

Corruption defined as a breach of contract with externalities, constituting at least a three agent game which can derive in the typology of contracts private, public, and political (Alemann, 1995). Corruption is always a process of exchange between two persons groups: The corrupter (A), who has economic resources at his disposal, and the corruptible person (corruptee B), who has power resources at his disposal.

#### ***D. Way Corruption typology of Punch (2000)***

Punch (2000) defines corruption as doing something against the officer's duty in exchange for money or gifts from an external corruptor. The 3 way typology of corruption, misconduct and crime modeled by Punch (2000) distinguishes between 3 categories of police deviance. This typology only applies to corruption in police.

- 1) *Corruption* is the conventional understanding of taking something (such as a bribe), against your duty, to do or not to do something, as an exchange from an external corruptor.
- 2) *Misconduct* involves police breaking their own internal rules and procedures.
- 3) *Police crime* describes behavior such as using excessive violence, drug dealing, theft and burglary, sexual harassment, and violating a person's rights. These behaviors are considered as corrupted but also described by law as criminal behaviors.

Punch (2000) provides more detail on the nature of those incidents and who is involved. The typology describes the purposes defining what we are looking at and provide a useful framework for further exploring other causal factors such as personality, background, social dynamics, as well as tailoring prevention efforts.

#### ***E. Typology of corruption in privatization of state owned companies Tserendondov (2001)***

Analyzing the case of corruption in privatization of state owned enterprises in Mongolia, Tserendondov (2001) develops a typology of corruption which provides a framework of reference for dealing with individual corruption in different contexts of privatization:

- 1) Taking state assets without competition and misusing public funds for their own benefit.
- 2) State individuals, groups, or firms using their current position and

authority to influence the formation of privatization laws and other government policies.

- 3) Bankrupting state owned enterprises and assigning a lower value than the real estimate have become common types of abuses in privatization.
- 4) The law is breached by privatizing property into the ownership of unfairly authorized people or by privatizing it based on a low appraisal of property value.

Holmes (2006) is optimistic about the possibility of building a comprehensive hierarchical typology of corruption which is a challenging task for methodological and empirical reasons.

#### **F. Corruption typology of Miller (2003)**

Miller (2001, 2003) sustains that officers are vulnerable to bribes when they feel let down by their job and develop a dual typology of corruption:

– *Individual* vs. Organized, internally *networked*

#### **G. Corruption typology of Skogan and Meares (2004)**

- 1) *Proactive* vs. *reactive*
- 2) *Personal gain* vs. *organizational gain* ('noble-cause' corruption)

Rasma (2005) presented her typology of corruption and how the combination of systemic inadequacies and a culture of impunity have created an environment in which corruption can flourish unchecked.

#### **H. Corruption typology of Pedersen and Johannsen (2008)**

Pedersen and Johannsen (2008) have developed a typology of corruption based on actor categories. See table 2. A typology of corruption can be developed as an analytical tool based on different levels of severity of state capture, administrative corruption and other determinants associated with the institutional capacity of the state.

### ***I. Corruption typology of Baker (2005).***

Ray Baker's typology of corruption considers the following forms of corruption based on the actors:

- 1) Traditional government corruption,
- 2) criminal corruption,
- 3) entrepreneurial governmental corruption.

Table 2: A typology of corruption based on actor categories

		The purchaser	The provider
Petty corruption	Day-to-day corruption	Individual citizens	Individual providers of public services – health personnel, police
	Administrative malpractice	Individual economic actors – firms etc.	Public control and licensing agencies
Grand corruption	Political state capture	Collective economic actors – interest organizations Individual economic actors	Politicians – individuals and political parties

Source: Pedersen and Johannsen (2008)

Political influence, state capture and administrative corruption are phenomena at the interface between the public sphere in which political actors, public administrators and civil servants operate and relate to actors of the private sphere, persons, firms, nongovernmental organizations, civil society, etc.

### ***J. Typology of Cahn and Gambino (2008)***

Cahn and Gambino (2008) have developed a corruption typology based on natural resources, commodity dependence, and good governance in different contexts identifying four broad categories of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This typology is intended to emphasize the importance of poor governance to underdevelopment and clarifies the need for different strategies for countries in four different categories.

- 1) Category 0 denotes the near-absence of both effective governance and significant levels of foreign investment. Higher levels of corruption.

- 2) Category 1 denotes countries highly dependent on a single-source of export revenue and economic dependence that creates opportunities for corruption and can have anti-democratic consequences.
- 3) Category 2 includes countries that have a broader range of export commodities characterized by substantial levels of external investment and governments that are more interested in decreasing corruption and improving the business environment.
- 4) Category 3 includes nations where country governance is much improved and vastly better than other countries, economies are diversified, with strong agricultural sectors, and levels of foreign investment are reasonably high. Lower levels of corruption.

#### ***K. Corruption typology of Merat and Roth Deubel (2008)***

Merat and Roth Deubel (2008) use the typology of both formal and informal institutions proposed by Gretchen and Levitsky (2006), who distinguishes informal institutions according to the complementary, substitutive, accommodative and competitive types. Merat and Roth Deubel (2008) analyze on the basis of North's neoinstitutionalist framework violence and corruption corresponding with the presence of informal institutions and powerful armed groups who compete with the formal institutions and pursue divergent goals, drawing from the case of the municipality of Tumaco, Colombia. In this case, the local institutional level, where the balance of power is in favor of informal institutions, is the most affected.

#### ***L. Corruption typology of Pedersen and Johannsen (2008)***

The typology used by Pedersen and Johannsen (2008) for measuring corruption distinguishes:

Day-to-day corruption that takes place at the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy related to ways of behavior that are necessary and appropriate to get things done and administrative malpractice.

Grand corruption is at the middle and higher level of public administration and directly in the political sphere that circumvents legitimate democratic decisions and decision making. This type of corruption is related to the specific context of transforming and redefining private-public relations in society.

Pedersen and Johannsen (2008) illustrate how this typology may be applied in terms of concrete position in the political and administrative sphere, in the following table.

Table 3. Identification of the ‘provider’ of corruption

Grand corruption	Parliament
Grand corruption/ Administrative malpractice	Ministers
Administrative malpractice	Top level officials
	Intermediate level officials
‘day-to-day’ corruption	Lower level officials

Source: Pedersen and Johannsen (2008)

### ***M. Corruption typology of Transparency International (TI) UK***

Based on economic and political defense analysis, the Transparency International UK has developed a typology of corruption as a framework for defense. In one of the main categories of the typology of defense corruption, political context and control, corruption in the defense establishment under democratic political authority encompasses, over-elaborate and non-agreed defense policy, hidden defense budgets, underestimated or off-budget defense spending, cronyism and dishonest leadership level, secret power networks, organized crime links, misuse and control of intelligence for corrupt purposes, misuse of investigatory powers, misuse of power to influence legislation and parliamentary investigations, corruption of the judicial process, involvement in elections and politics, and ultimately state capture, de facto illicit takeover of defense by officials (TI UK, 2009).

Table 4: Corruption – framework for defense

Political Context And Control	Defense Processes	Defense Personnel
Defense policy	Procurement, bribery, diversion of funds	Values, standards, rules, weak, ignored.
Defense budgets, not transparent, debated or audited	Salaries, diversion of funds	
Leadership and accountability, dishonest, unclear or split	Property and sales	Small bribes

Organized crime links	Personal control of secret budgets	Money for security
Control of intelligence	Private businesses	
State capture	Reward, promotion, disciplinary, failures, inequities	Job preferences

Source: TI UK (2009)

One set of problems with the literature on corruption typology is that it offers a very narrow definition of corruption, whereas there is a need to proffer one comprehensive framework for analyzing a wider typology of corruption phenomena.

### III. Levels of corruption

Corruption is present on both the low and high levels of the bureaucracy and also both types of corruption are linked by corruption on the intermediate levels of the bureaucracy. Levels of corruption indicate where corruption can be encountered.

Alemann (1995) has proposed the following levels of corruption:

#### 1). Vertical levels of corruption

- a) local politics (micro level)
- b) middle level, regions (meso level)
- c) nation-state level (macro level)
- d) international level (mega level)

#### 2). Horizontal areas of corruption

- a) administration of housing and construction
- b) agencies of economic development
- c) procurement administration
- d) licenses, approvals
- e) military procurement
- f) secret services



A well know characterization of levels of corruption considers individual, business and political corruption.

- 1) Individual corruption takes place primarily in relations between individual citizens and public officials and authorities.
- 2) Business corruption takes place primarily in relations between enterprises/ companies and public officials and authorities.
- 3) Political corruption takes place in the higher echelons of public administration and on a political level.

Levels of corruption are associated with economic and political factors although it is hard to establish a robust causal link between levels of corruption and levels of economic performance. The same is truth for a relationship between levels of corruption and levels of political development.

According to the modernization hypothesis, the modernization process brings corruption (Huntington, 1968; Scott, 1972). Countries with faster developing economies tend to have higher levels of corruption. Therefore, Countries that modernize faster tend to have higher levels of corruption that could be perceived as the result of “the law of inertia” by which parts of the society pioneer in modernization while other parts were reluctant to change. However, some developing countries challenge systemic corruption and have lower levels of corruption than some wealthy countries.

Functionalists (Leff, 1964; Ney, 1967; Huntington, 1968) emphasize the positive effects of corruption on development arguing that corruption is likely to increase the efficiency of government, overcome bureaucratic obstacles and divisions in ruling elite that might otherwise result in destructive conflict. These arguments are rejected by empirical research. Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Montinola and Jackman, 2002) show that high levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of investment and economic growth.

Some economists agree that there are significant correlations between high levels of corruption and economic consequences such as the inefficiencies in the operation of markets, distorting the composition of public expenditure by focusing spending on activities likely to yield large bribes and reducing the level of direct foreign investment by adding costs and creating uncertainty. Montinola and Jackman (2002) and Xin and Rudel (2004) found that large government spending is associated with lower levels of corruption. Fisman and Gatti (2000)

have demonstrated that more decentralized countries have lower levels of corruption.

Countries that have relatively low levels of corruption may attract significantly more investment than those perceived to be more prone to corrupt or illicit activity (Campos and Pradhan, 1997). Higher levels of corruption are associated with greater government intervention in economy. The public choice theory asserted that large government sectors are associated with higher levels of corruption. Firms can contribute to have higher levels of corruption by seeking rent compete for government contracts and licenses not through price mechanisms but through bribes to public officials.

States with high levels of corruption are not incompatible with high levels of economic growth although if those states had been able to reduce their levels of corruption, they would have experienced even higher rates of economic growth. In a large robust dynamic economy, the economic costs of low levels of corruption are minimal, while in a fragile, unbalanced, stagnant economy, the economic costs of high levels of corruption are insupportable. Countries that tolerate relatively high levels of corruption are unlikely to perform high rates of economic growth although may enjoy still decent rates. High levels of corruption may tend to increase imports of goods and services.

In developing economies there seems to be significant correlation between high levels of corruption and lower levels of investment and growth. Mauro (1995), based on cross-country perceived corruption studies finds a direct link between high levels of corruption and low levels of foreign direct investment and that corruption is strongly negatively associated with the investment rate. Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) found that corrupt procurement practices reduce growth by reducing the productivity of public investment, increasing public investment that is not adequately supported by nonwage expenditure on operation and maintenance, reducing the quality of the existing infrastructure and by decreasing the government revenue needed to finance productive spending.

In developing countries, Boerner and Hainz (2004) observe high levels of corruption even if they have democratic political systems. One of the reasons is that functioning financial institutions reduce the incentives of some groups of voters to support high levels of corruption. Lower levels of corruption are associated with more democratic countries under the assumption that democracy may have some attributes to reduce corruption, although some emerging democracies have exhibited higher levels of corruption than authoritarian regimes.

An institutional factor that matters for corruption is the fairness of the legal system, not the efficiency of the legal system. In policy strangling regulation

leads to higher levels of corruption. The relationship between corruption and trust in informal institutions makes the most effective means to obtain goods and services, which in turn increases the levels of corruption. Mistrust creates an inefficient public sector that in turn raises levels of corruption and undermines popular trust in the state. Thus, corruption and the lack of institutional trust feed each other, producing a vicious circle.

Social groups may contribute to higher levels of corruption by seizing the opportunity to exploit the power vacuum and expanding the groups' interests at the expense of the society. Countries with higher levels of human development have lower perceived levels of corruption, as measured by the control of corruption index. Higher levels of corruption are correlated with lower school enrolment and higher dropout and illiteracy rates, blocking key routes out of poverty. Countries with high levels of corruption also have higher levels of poverty. Inequality leads to low out-group trust, which in turn leads to high level of corruption. Land reform and the initial adoption of industrial policy produced different levels of inequality, and thereby different levels of corruption and social trust. Countries with low levels of corruption tend to have fewer conflicts and can exacerbate the impact of natural disasters.

Chakrabarti (2001) demonstrates that societies have locally stable equilibrium levels of corruption that depend upon a small number of socio-economic factors and shows that under certain conditions it is possible for corruption to go on an ever-increasing trajectory till it stifles all economic activity.

It is difficult to assess the overall levels of corruption phenomena based on empirical or perceived data which do not reflect the realities of corruption world. Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) assume that each source is a noisy indicator for an unobservable component. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a composite index that assesses and compares perceived levels of corruption among public officials and politicians in a wide range of countries around the world reflecting the views of business people and country analysts from around the world.

## **5- Use of corruption typologies as a conceptual tool**

In this final section it is analyzed how these typologies would serve as a conceptual tool for readers for the purpose of fighting against corruption. The notion of type refers to certain symbols and characteristics given to similarities or differences between entities or categorical units that form part of a classification given in a more complex reality. Types have been defined as conceptual and

mental constructs. Stinchcombe (1968, p. 43-45) defines "...a type concept in scientific discourse is a concept which is constructed out of a combination of the values of several variables... The variables that combine to form a type must be correlated or "connected to each other". A typology is a part of taxonomy dedicated to the systematic multiple classification, study and analysis based on categories or types of phenomena. Thus typological classifications are a method to classify systems used in qualitative analysis.

A constructed type is more general than the ideal type. A constructed type is defined by McKinney (1966, p. 3) defines the constructed type as "a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, combination, and (sometimes) accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referents that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical cases." The ideal type is a mental construct of one or more points of view that diverges of reality and cannot be found empirically. Classification considered either as a process or as an outcome is defined as the grouping of similar entities on the basis of mutually exclusive and exhaustive characteristics and dimensions. Taxonomy is the theoretical study of classification, including its bases, principles, procedures, and rules (Simpson, 1961, p. 11).

The purpose of any typology is to provide a "systematic classificatory grouping of phenomena" (*International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1968) in order to facilitate the analysis, explanation, codification and creation of knowledge in a discipline. A typology has the function to provide criteria for comparative purposes for the empirical phenomena. Typologies are mostly descriptive and at the early level of analysis and more elaborated models may focus on explanation and prediction. Sound typologies may develop new concepts and theories, provides a comprehensive overview and facilitates research. However, the notion, nature and use of types have been methodological and ideologically objected (Simpson 1945, p. 28).

According to the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968) the typological classification is significant in methodological functions of codification and prediction. It also creates order of the elements and relevant cluster of traits of a population and help to predict some relationships. A good typology of corruption, well explicitly may functions as a theoretical model useful to explain the relationships of different units between systems. The construction of any typology of corruption as any other theoretical model for any order of phenomena are based in assumptions to warrant more formal propositions and rules logically, meaningfully coherent and intrinsically related between different types of corruption in the same dimensions. Nevertheless, the typological approach may lack the flexibility to classify concrete phenomena in spatial,

temporal, and contextual specificities.

Using few types to correlate some dimensions may require making them clear in order to represent a full range of values on each dimension and to extend the property and attribute spaces to other related types. This process is called substruction. The opposite process is called reduction used when the size of a full typology is unmanaged (Lazarsfeld, 1937; Barton 1955). A full typology can be reduced by using quantitative methods. A method of functional reduction is by definition a correlation of typology construction and performs pragmatic reduction.

A typology of corruption is parsimony in such a way that any large number of individual cases can be grouped into a few main types and any complexity of phenomena can be treated with simplicity. A well constructed typology of corruption can treat relevant relationships between dimensions and categories, the range of all variables and their confluences. A typology of corruption can be used as a tool for comparative purposes, to highlight theoretical dimensions and to analyze relationships and interactions of combined variables (Stinchcombe 1968, pp. 46-47).

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